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Abstract:  
We study the impact of international trade on firm-level wage bargaining using a unique 
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1. Introduction 
The recent empirical literature has shown that firm-level trade participation through exports 
and offshoring affects firm-level wages, with heterogeneous effects according to the workers’ 
skills and occupation. A rich theoretical literature points to rent-sharing as a key mechanism 
through which trade-created revenues are transmitted to wages (see Harrison et al., 2011, for a 
survey). Collective bargaining of wages between workers and firms is the most important 
formal rent-sharing mechanism in many European countries.2 Consistently with the 
theoretical predictions, recent empirical contributions have shown that the impact of trade 
shocks on firm-level wages differs according to whether wages are bargained collectively or 
not (e.g. Felbermayr et al., 2014; Carluccio et al., 2015).  
An important question that remains open is whether the bargaining level is exogenous to 
international trade, as assumed in current theoretical and empirical work, or if instead trade 
liberalization impacts wages also through modifying the wage-bargaining process itself. In 
this paper we provide an answer to such question. We ask whether the likelihood that firms 
sign collective firm-level wage agreements is affected by exports and offshoring 
opportunities. We rely on a unique administrative dataset collected by the French Ministry of 
Labor that provides information on all collective wage agreements signed at the firm level 
over the period 1996-2009. We complement it with administrative data on firm-level exports, 
imports, and balance sheets.  
Our results show that international trade affects the wage bargaining process at the firm level. 
We control for the endogeneity of exports and offshoring using firm-specific instruments 
based on world demand and supply shocks in the spirit of Autor et al. (2013) and Hummels et 
al. (2014). We find that a 1% increase in exported values leads to a 0.7 percentage point (pp) 
increase in the probability of signing a collective wage agreement. We do not find a 
significant impact of offshoring. The results are robust to the inclusion of firm-level 
covariates, in particular firm size, and are stable across different time periods.  
The results fit well with the long-standing notion that unions are rent-seeking entities. The 
rents creates by exports shocks provide incentives for workers to bargain collectively to reap a 
share of those rents. The non-significant effect of offshoring might be the result of the 
combination of two opposing forces. On the one hand, offshoring boosts productivity, raising 
                                                          
2 The percentage of workers covered by collective agreements is of over 70% in most countries in continental 
Europe (Venn, 2009). 
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profits (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008), and thus providing higher incentives for 
collective bargaining. On the other hand, offshoring can replace tasks previously carried out 
by domestic workers, eroding worker’s bargaining power (Dumont et al., 2006). 
The key message of our paper is that the wage bargaining regime is endogenous to export 
demand shocks. Our results can inform future theoretical and empirical research on the impact 
of trade on firm-level wages, as the existing literature has concentrated on how the bargaining 
regime shapes the effect of trade on wages, taking bargaining regimes as exogenous to trade 
(e.g., Felbermayr et al., 2011; Ranjan, 2013). One exception is Capuano et al. (2014), who 
finds that exports have a non-significant effect on the choice of bargaining level by German 
firms, once firm size is controlled for. By pointing to trade as a relevant variable affecting the 
bargaining level, our results also complement previous analyses that have focused on the role 
of technology (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001 and Hirsch et al., 2014).  
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
We rely on a large firm-level dataset covering the period 1996-2009. This dataset is obtained 
by combining three administrative sources with firm-level information on collective 
agreements, imports and exports, and balance sheet data. Information on firm-level wage 
agreements come from an exhaustive data set collected by the French Ministry of Labor. 
Firms are required by law to report on all concluded firm-level agreements every year. 
Available variables include a firm identifier, year of the agreement and whether the 
agreements deal with wages. Data on exports and offshoring come from an exhaustive 
administrative file (source: French Customs). For each firm over the period 1996-2009, the 
Customs data report the yearly value of exports (by country of destination and product) and 
imports (by country of origin and product). We follow the methodology of Feenstra and 
Hanson (1999) and measure offshoring as imports of goods that belong to the industry where 
the firm operates. This measure attempts to capture the transfer abroad of production activities 
that were carried out (or could have been carried out) by the same firm in France. These 
goods produced with foreign labor are more likely to substitute for domestic labor. Finally, 
the administrative BRN dataset (‘Bénéfices Réels Normaux’) is used to estimate firm-level 
total factor productivity (TFP) and other firm-level controls. We match the different datasets 
using the common firm identifier. We restrict our sample to imports and exports of 
manufactured products (95% of reported trade values) by firms in the manufacturing sector. 
We focus on the intensive margin of trade, and keep firms only in the years in which they 
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both import and export.3 We also exclude small firms (with less than 20 employees) which are 
very unlikely to sign a wage agreement since there is generally no union representative in 
those firms. Overall, our sample contains about 69,000 observations corresponding to 10,800 
firms on the period 1996-2009.  
The wage bargaining institutional setup in France is similar to the one existing in most 
continental European countries. Wages can be negotiated at two levels: industry and firm. 
Industry-level wage agreements define wage floors by occupation (Fougère et al., 2016). 
These agreements apply to all firms in a given industry through extension procedures 
implemented by the Ministry of Labor. Opting out of an industry agreement is not possible4. 
Firms and unions can sign firm-level wage agreements, provided that wages are not set below 
industry-level wage floors. Given this, in our analysis we model firms’ decision to sign firm-
level agreements.  
About 16% of firms in our sample are covered by a wage agreement during the sample period. 
Between-firm heterogeneity is quite large. On average, 32% of firms with more than 75 
employees sign a wage agreement versus less than 5% for firms with less than 75 employees. 
Firm-level bargaining process is quite persistent over time. A decomposition of the variance 
of the dummy variable “firm-level wage agreement” reveals that over a half of the total 
variance is explained by between-firm variation. Over our sample period, the share of firms 
covered by a wage agreement increases somewhat. However, the within-firm variation is 
rather weak. 
[Figure 1] 
Figure 1 plots the frequency of wage agreements against firm-level export and offshoring 
intensities (normalized by sales as the denominator to account for size effects). The 
occurrence of a wage agreement is positively correlated with export intensity, even after 
controlling for size. On average, 10% of firms with the lowest export intensity (i.e., belonging 
to the first decile) are covered by a wage agreement, whereas 24% of firms with the highest 
export intensity (i.e., belonging to the highest decile) do so. The correlation between the 
frequency of wage agreements and offshoring intensity is weaker. It seems quite stable over 
                                                          
3 Identification of the effect of the extensive margin of trade (i.e. changes in firms’ trade status) is made difficult 
by the limited variation in trade status over time. 
4 This is an important difference with Germany, where firms are allowed to unilaterally opt-out of industry-level 
agreements.  
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the deciles of the distribution of offshoring intensity (in particular for small firms, Figure A in 
the Appendix). 
 
3. Empirical model and results 
We estimate a Probit model relating the occurrence of a firm-level wage agreement to exports 
and imports over the period 1996-2009: yit = 1  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 yit∗ > 0 
and yit = 0  𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 yit∗ ≤ 0 
with yit∗ = 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ln 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒 ln 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖  + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where yit  is a variable equal to 1 if a wage agreement is signed in a given firm i and in a 
given year t, ln 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the logarithm of exports by firm i in year t, ln 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the logarithm 
of offshoring by firm i in year t, 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of covariates including firm-level controls in 
year t (the number of employees, TFP, sales, the share of skilled workers, and the capital-
labor ratio) and year- and 4-digit- industry dummies. 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is a random effect (specific to firm i) 
and we also include the within-firm average of firm-level controls as regressors; this Mundlak 
formulation allows us to capture the correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and the 
covariates that can make the random effect model inconsistent. 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 is a year dummy, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 
an i.i.d. random term (white noise) with mean 0 and variance 𝜎𝜎𝜀𝜀2.  
Unobservable shocks can simultaneously affect the occurrence of a firm-level wage 
agreement and trade flows for a given firm. To account for this potential endogeneity bias we 
use an instrumental regression. We use demand and supply shocks from the rest of the world 
as instruments for exports and offshoring (following Autor et al., 2013 and Hummels et al., 
2014). Those instruments that we used in a previous study (Carluccio et al., 2015) are specific 
to a given firm and a given year. More details and the results of the first-stage regression are 
provided in Table A in the Appendix.5 
[Table 1] 
Table 1 reports the marginal effects from the Probit regressions. In column (1) exports are 
estimated to have a positive and statistically significant impact on the probability of a wage 
agreement at the firm level: marginal effects suggest that a 1% increase of exports leads to a 
                                                          
5 A detailed robustness analysis of the instruments is provided in Carluccio et al. (2015). 
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3.5 pp increase in the probability of a firm-level wage agreement. After controlling for 
endogeneity of exports, the impact remains positive and statistically significant. The effect of 
offshoring is slightly positive: a 1% increase of offshoring leads to an increase in the 
probability of a wage agreement at the firm-level of 1 pp. Our results are quite robust to the 
inclusion of controls that have the expected effects but the magnitude of the impact of trade 
decreases. The effect of 1% increase of exports is estimated to be 0.7 pp on the probability of 
a firm-level agreement whereas it is only 0.1 pp for offshoring and not significant after 
correcting for the endogeneity bias (column 4). As expected, firm size appears as a crucial 
determinant of wage agreements: the marginal effect is over 4 pp. This size effect might be at 
least partly associated with the bargaining power of employees since unionization tends to be 
higher in large firms.6 Finally, we find a positive and significant effect of the firm’s 
productivity and of the capital-labor ratio; this last result can be rationalized by models with 
sunk capital and hold up (see, e.g., Grout, 1984).  
We ran a series of robustness checks, presented in Tables B and C of the Appendix. First, we 
estimated the model by firm size and find that the effect of exports on the signing of a wage 
agreement increases with the size of the firm, whereas the impact of offshoring remains non-
significant all across the board. Interestingly, for the largest firms, size, productivity, and 
exports all have a positive and significant effect on the signing of a wage agreement. We 
divide the sample into two sub-periods (1996-2002 and 2003-2009) and find that the effect of 
exports is stable over time, with an almost identical coefficient in each subsample. Finally, to 
control for high persistence of the bargaining process and to identify the contribution of trade 
to time variations in wage bargaining, we exclude all firms which never sign any wage 
agreement over the period: we still find a positive but non-significant effect of exports and a 
small negative effect of offshoring.7 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we use detailed firm-level data to test whether trade shocks lead firms to sign 
collective wage agreements. We find that exports shocks have a positive and significant effect 
on the probability of signing a wage agreement at the firm level, while the effect of offshoring 
is not statistically significant. Our findings have implications for the debate on the impact of 
trade on wage inequality. A consequent body of work, based on the seminal paper by Melitz 
                                                          
6 Capuano et al. (2014) argue that size, productivity, and exports are highly correlated, and find on German data 
that the effect of exports disappear once firm size is included in the regression.  
7 We also considered a sample of firms that are present at least 10 years, and find a similar positive effect of 
exports. 
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(2003), points out that trade creates between-firm dispersion in revenues that translates into 
wages through rent-sharing. Our results unveil an extra margin through which trade affects 
wages. The between-firm variation in export and offshoring participation translates into 
variation in bargaining regimes between firms. Given that wages are more sensitive to trade in 
firms with collective bargaining, changes in bargaining regimes enhance the trade-created 
between-firm wage dispersion.  
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Table 1: Marginal effects of a Probit model for signing a firm-level wage agreement 
Dependent variable Signing of a firm level wage agreement  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(exports) 0.035*** 0.042*** 0.006*** 0.007*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln(offshoring) 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.001* 0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln(TFP) 
  0.015*** 0.014*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) 
Ln(firm size) 
  0.045*** 0.044*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) 
Capital/labor ratio 
  0.027*** 0.027*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
Share of high-skilled 
workers  
  0.015 0.015 
  (0.015) (0.015) 
Sales 
  0.001 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
IV No Yes No Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 70,826 70,826 69,358 69,358 
Number of firms 10,842 10,842 10,756 10,756 
Average obs. per firm 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.4 
Log-likelihood -21,477.2 -21,320.1 -20,303.1 -20,307.0 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in brackets. Period: 1996-2009. Year dummies, 
industry dummies and firm-specific random effects are included in all specifications. The sample consists of firms that both 
export and import at least half of the observation period. Firms with less than 20 employees are excluded. 
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Figure 1: Frequency of firm-level wage agreements (in %) by export and offshoring intensity 
(deciles) 
 
Notes: This figure plots the frequency of firm-level wage agreements as a function of the trade intensity of firms. The 
frequency of wage agreements is computed as the ratio between the number of firms covered by a firm-level wage agreement 
divided by the total number of firms. Export intensity is calculated as the ratio between the value of exports and the value of 
total sales (at the firm level). We then compute deciles of the sample distribution of export intensity. We compute the 
frequency of wage agreements at each decile of the export intensity distribution. Same calculations are made for offshoring 
intensities.  
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APPENDIX (not intended for publication) 
Instrumentation strategy 
Our instrumentation strategy follows a recent strand of literature which uses world demand 
and supply shocks specific to each product-country pair as exogenous shifters (see, e.g., Autor 
et al., 2013, Hummels et al., 2014). Each firm in the sample exports and imports a set of 
products to/from a set of countries. The assumption is that a shock to the demand of a product 
p in a country c would translate into higher imports into country c of this particular product p. 
French firms exporting the product p to country c would then raise their exports to that 
country. Similarly, increases in world exports of product p by country c reflect increases in 
the competitiveness of country c for the product p. French firms importing product p from 
country c would respond to this shock by increasing their imports of product p from the 
country c. The exclusion restriction is satisfied as long as foreign demand and supply shocks 
are exogenous to French firms’ wage setting. Carluccio et al. (2015) provide a detailed 
analysis of the instruments along with a wide set of robustness analyses. 
World demand 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and world supply  𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 addressed to firm i in year t are: 
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖,𝑒𝑒                                 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑒𝑒  
where 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 and  𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 are respectively world demand and supply for a product-country 
pair at time t computed using data at the 6-digit level of the Harmonised System HS from the 
BACI dataset constructed by CEPII.8 We calculate the firm-specific shares sicp of each pair 
(product p, country c) in total exports (respectively, offshoring) using average shares of the 
products actually exported (respectively, imported) over  the period 1996-2009.  
Our instrumentation equation is: ln 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ln𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 ln𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒  + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ln 𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ln𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ln𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  + 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of firm-level controls identical to the one used in our Probit model, 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 
and 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 are year dummies, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝜁𝜁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are i.i.d. random terms with mean 0 and variances 
𝜎𝜎𝜖𝜖
2 and 𝜎𝜎𝜁𝜁2, respectively.  
                                                          
8The BACI dataset is constructed using bilateral trade data at HS 6-digit level from COMTRADE. It can be 
downloaded at http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=1  
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TABLE A: Instrumental regression 
Dependent variable Exports Offshoring 
World demand (exports) 
0.353*** 0.232*** 0.119*** 0.019 
(0.032) (0.030) (0.041) (0.039) 
World supply (imports) 
0.097*** 0.046** 0.560*** 0.487*** 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.042) (0.040) 
TFP 
 0.446***  0.220*** 
 (0.017)  (0.026) 
Firm size 
 0.979***  0.541*** 
 (0.027)  (0.039) 
Capital/labor ratio 
 0.227***  0.121*** 
 (0.018)  (0.026) 
Share of high-skilled workers  
 0.141**  0.288*** 
 (0.056)  (0.077) 
Sales  
 -0.071***  0.278*** 
 (0.017)  (0.026) 
Intercept 
9.172*** 4.962*** 4.138*** -0.151 
(0.419) (0.399) (0.867) (0.839) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 71,104 69,626 71,104 69,626 
Number of firms 10,887 10,800 10,887 10,800 
Average obs. per firm 6.5 6.4 6.5 6.4 
Within R-squared 0.086 0.201 0.117 0.156 
Between R-squared 0.042 0.456 0.033 0.182 
Overall R-squared 0.039 0.471 0.033 0.183 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in 
brackets. Year dummies and firm fixed-effects are included in all specifications. ‘Exports’ is the log of the value of 
exports. ‘Offshoring’ is the log of the value of imports of goods belonging to the same industry as that of the 
importing firm. Firm-level controls (size, TFP, capital/labor and domestic sales) are in logs. Product shares entering 
world demand and world supply are calculated at their overall sample (1996-2009) firm value.  
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Figure A: Frequency of firm-level wage agreements (in %) by export and offshoring intensity 
(deciles) and by firm size 
a) Small firms 
 
b) Large firms 
 
Notes: This figure plots the frequency of firm-level wage agreements as a function of the trade intensity of firms. The 
frequency of wage agreements is computed as the ratio between the number of firms covered by a firm-level wage agreement 
divided by the total number of firms. Export intensity is calculated as the ratio between the value of exports and the value of 
total sales (at the firm level). We then compute deciles of the sample distribution of export intensity. We compute the 
frequency of wage agreement at each decile of the export intensity distribution. Same calculations are made for offshoring 
intensities.  
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Table B: Marginal effects of a Probit model for signing a firm-level wage agreement (by firm 
size) 
Dependent variable Signing of a firm level wage agreement  
 Less than 
40 workers 
40-75 
workers 
76-180 
workers 
More than 
180 workers 
Ln(exports) 0.001* 0.002** 0.007* 0.017*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) 
Ln(offshoring) 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) 
Ln(TFP) -0.000 0.006* 0.012 0.054*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.016) 
Ln(firm size) 0.005 0.025*** 0.070*** 0.074*** 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.015) (0.024) 
Capital/labor ratio 0.003 0.005 0.033*** 0.068*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.011) (0.009) 
Share of high-skilled 
workers  
0.009* 0.015 0.024 -0.023 
(0.005) (0.012) (0.036) (0.064) 
Sales -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.006 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010) 
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,354 15,612 17,076 17,522 
Number of firms 3,439 3,750 3,426 2,695 
Average obs. per firm 3.9 4.2 5.0 6.5 
Log-likelihood -959.3 -2,538.5 -6,179.6 -10,076.4 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in brackets. Period: 1996-2009. Year dummies, 
industry dummies and firm-specific random effects are included in all specifications. The sample consists of firms that both 
export and import at least half of the observation period. Firms with less than 20 employees are excluded. 
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Table C: Marginal effects of a Probit model for signing a firm-level wage agreement – 
robustness checks 
Dependent variable Signing of a firm level wage agreement  
Subsample: 1996-2002 2003-2009 At least one agreement 
Surviving 
firms 
Ln(exports) 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.005 0.005 (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Ln(offshoring) 0.001 0.000 -0.004 0.001 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Ln(TFP) 0.003 0.019*** 0.060*** 0.015*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006) 
Ln(firm size) 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.164*** 0.059*** 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.017) (0.009) 
Capital/labor ratio 0.021*** 0.030*** 0.103*** 0.020*** 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.007) 
Share of high-skilled 
workers  
0.006 0.011 0.073 0.041* 
(0.020) (0.027) (0.046) (0.020) 
Sales 0.000 0.008* 0.004 -0.001 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) 
IV Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 36,321 32,831 28,325 36,519 
Number of firms 8,841 7,505 3,320 3,006 
Average obs. per firm 4.1 4.4 8.5 12.1 
Log-likelihood -10,539.0 -9,858.8 -16,758.1 -11,781.1 
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors are reported in brackets. Period: 1996-2009. Year dummies, 
industry dummies and firm-specific random effects are included in all specifications. The sample consists of firms that both 
export and import at least half of the observation period. Firms with less than 20 employees are excluded. The “At least one 
agreement” subsample includes only firms that sign at least one wage agreement during the sample period. The “Surviving 
firms” subsample includes firms that are present in the sample for at least 10 years.  
